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Marx and the Need for Critical Philosophy Today 
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Abstract 
Marx is famous for apparently dismissing the practical role of philosophy. Yet, as 
accumulating empirical knowledge of growing life-crises proves, the simply availability 
of facts is insufficient to motivate struggles for fundamental change. So too manifest 
social crisis. The economic crisis which began in 2008 has indeed motivated social 
struggles, but nothing on the order of the revolutionary struggles Marx expected. 
Rather than make Marx irrelevant, however, the absence of global struggles for truly 
radical change make his early engagement with the role of philosophy more important 
than ever. This engagement suggests a conception of philosophy as a uniquely practical 
discipline distinguished from empirical science by its unique capacity to synthesise 
values from the facts of life. The article examines the development of this conception 
of philosophy in Marx’s early work and concludes with the outlines for a new critical 
philosophy capable of generating a new set of universal values necessary to motivate 
anti-capitalist struggles today. 
 
Résumé 
Si Hegel a raison et que la philosophie émerge toujours dans un monde social dans 
lequel les contradictions se sont fossilisées, où le pouvoir d'unification semble avoir 
disparu, alors notre monde est un monde qui a besoin de la philosophie. L’automne 
2008 a été témoin du début d'une crise économique qui promet d’être la pire de sa 
génération. La crise économique est liée à une crise politique de la démocratie sur le 
long terme (même si la crise n’est pas typiquement reconnue comme telle), 
caractérisée à travers le monde par un retrait de la régulation de l’activité économique 
par l’Etat et (sous le prétexte de la ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’) l’hyperrégulation des 
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vies publiques et privées des citoyens. Les crises économiques et politiques sont toutes 
deux enserrées dans une profonde crise environnementale provoquée par la croissance 
hypertrophiée de l’économie capitaliste dirigée par l’argent-comme-valeur. Si cette 
valeur est en crise parce qu’elle ne peut plus ‘unifier’ le monde social (elle est 
maintenant la cause et non pas la solution des problèmes fondamentaux de la vie 
humaine) alors la philosophie, si Hegel a raison, devrait être conviée en tant qu'unique 
pratique intellectuelle capable de générer une nouvelle synthèse sur la base des 
nouvelles valeurs (ou au moins une nouvelle articulation des anciennes valeurs). 
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If Hegel is correct and philosophy always appears in a social world whose 
contradictions have become ossified, where it appears that the ‘power of 
unification’ has been lost, then ours is a world in need of philosophy (Hegel 
1978, 12).  Autumn 2008 witnessed the onset of an economic crisis that 
promises to be the worst in at least a generation.  The economic crisis was 
related to a longer term political crisis of democracy (although this crisis is 
usually not named as such) characterised across the globe by a 
simultaneous withdrawal of state regulation of economic activity and 
(under the cover of the ‘War on Terror’) hyper-regulation of citizens’ 
public and private lives.  Both the economic and the political crisis are 
wrapped inside a deeper environmental crisis caused by the hypertrophied 
growth of the money-value steered capitalist economy. The longer-term 
threat to life and human life posed by the environmental crisis has recently 
been sidelined by politicians in full panic mode grasping for Keynesian 
mechanisms to restart the disrupted pattern of ever higher rates of 
commodity consumption, even though those rates of consumption, and the 
energy use they require, are at the root of the environmental crisis.  The 
overall structure of the crisis, however, is neither environmental, nor 
economic, nor political, but normative.  By ‘normative’ I mean that the 
crisis is generated by the steering value of contemporary liberal-
democratic-capitalist society.  That steering value is the increase of money 
wealth understood not only as an economic ‘necessity’ but also the social 
condition of individual ‘choice’ and the essence of good human lives.  If this 
value-system is in crisis because it can no longer ‘unify’ the social world 
then philosophy, if Hegel is correct, ought to be called forth to generate a 
new synthesis of values. 
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Where, however, is philosophy?  This question is not new but has 
been posed repeatedly in the history of philosophy.  In terms most relevant 
for the present argument it was posed by Max Horkheimer in the early 
1930s. Horkheimer was turning the Institute for Social Research in a new 
direction to enable it to understand the social and economic changes at the 
root of monopoly capitalism and mass culture.  Like Horkheimer, I am 
interested in defending a conception of philosophy ‘as a theoretical 
undertaking oriented to the general, the ‘essential’ ... capable of giving 
particular studies animating impulses’(Horkeimer 1993, 9).  That which I 
take as ‘essential’ to philosophy is its unique capacity for synthesising 
values out of the facts of life.  The Frankfurt School articulated some of the 
most sophisticated and important criticisms of twentieth century liberal-
capitalist society, but conditions today are not the conditions of the 1930s 
or even the 1960s.  Hence a new explanation of what it means to interpret 
philosophy as a value-synthesising discipline is required. 
There is no doubt that many philosophers from many different 
philosophical traditions have engaged themselves with different 
dimensions of the normative problems underlying the global crisis.  Yet, if 
we judge their efforts from the standpoint of civil society, the informal 
sphere of free association of which liberal and republican philosophers 
have been so enamoured over the past two decades, these efforts have 
been in vain.  Philosophical interventions into the crisis have almost no 
public standing.  Rare is the case where a philosopher appears on CNN, 
writes for the New York Times, is invited to non-academic conferences 
where concrete solutions to concrete problems are discussed, or even 
comes up in political conversation between citizens over a coffee or a beer.   
The public absence of philosophy is a sign that philosophy too faces a 
crisis, one whose timing could not be worse given the present world’s need 
for philosophy.  This crisis was first announced by Jean-Francois Lyotard 
more than two decades ago.  ‘Speculative or humanistic philosophy is 
forced to relinquish its legitimation duties, which explains why philosophy 
is facing a crisis wherever it persists in arrogating such functions and is 
reduced to the study of systems of logic or the history of ideas where it has 
been realistic enough to surrender them’ (Lyotard 1984, 41).   
There are exceptions, of course, the most important of which is 
perhaps Alain Badiou. Badiou directly confronts this crisis in Manifesto for 
Philosophy, but his response perhaps exemplifies rather than solves it 
(Badiou 1999).  Badiou’s ethical work, while it affirms a universal 
conception of the human good, rigidly distinguishes the good from our 
‘animal’ embodied nature. His ethic of truths is divorced from all 
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connection to the fundamental requirements of human life.  Truths are true 
just because people affirm them as true and persist in this affirmation 
against all opposition (Badiou 2001, 58; Badiou 2005, 202-208, 231-239, 
331-343). Yet what is at stake in the present crisis of values is precisely the 
natural and social foundations of human life-support, the ‘animal’ 
precondition for commitment to truths whatever the content of those 
commitments might be.  A philosophical response to this crisis that is 
worthy of the dignity of philosophy must articulate a new philosophical 
synthesis of the values that express humanity’s intrinsic dependence on 
the natural world and our interdependence with others in the social world. 
It must do so because those are the values whose loss or suppression are at 
the root of the crisis of life-value today.  
My argument will not explicate or defend the content of the new 
life-values that our world stands in need of today.  I have defended what I 
take these values to be in many other places over the past several years 
(Noonan 2006; 2007; 2008a; 2008b).   My focus here, rather, will be on 
philosophy itself, and in particular its being an essentially practical 
discipline uniquely structured to produce and defend a new value 
synthesis by a process of generalization of the ‘facts of life.’  Knowledge of 
these facts of life is supplied to philosophy, at least in part, by empirical 
disciplines. While this is a similar programmatic aim to that defended by 
Horkheimer, my historical touchstone lays behind the Frankfurt School in 
the work of Marx.  Some, many Marxists included, will find this choice 
ironic given that Marx apparently rejected the practical nature of 
philosophy.  Yet, Marx is the best historical platform from which to 
construct my argument. Marx was a philosopher that struggled repeatedly 
against philosophy.  He was constantly tempted in his later work by what 
he took to be the methods of natural science, but was unable to free his 
work from the values first synthesised philosophically in his early work.  
Marx’s body of work is famously huge, and I will not attempt a complete 
exegesis of even this thread of argument.  Instead, I will focus for the most 
part on the period from 1843 to 1845 in which his self-conscious struggle 
within and against philosophy was most acute.  Out of this struggle 
emerges a unique conception (or so I will argue) of the practical relevance 
of philosophy as a value synthesising discipline.  In the second section I will 
generalise Marx’s insights into a defence of philosophy today as the 
necessary condition for a new synthesis of life-values. These life-values 
must underlie, in some form, any possible solution to contemporary life-
crisis which is neither authoritarian nor regressive. 
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History, Philosophy, Values and the Future 
The Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach is generally interpreted as Marx’s final 
repudiation of philosophy in favour of empirical social criticism and 
revolutionary practice.  His words are terse and his meaning apparently 
unambiguous: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
different ways.  The point, however, is to change it’ (Suchting 1979, 24).  
However, if we set this aphorism in the context of his reflections on the 
practice of philosophy that led up to this apparently ultimate break with 
the discipline, ambiguity does indeed emerge. 
Marx’s earliest systematic thoughts on the status of philosophy in 
relation to empirical disciplines like history are scattered throughout his 
early criticisms of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and in letters to Feuerbach 
and Arnold Ruge.  When these thoughts are read in the political context in 
which Marx was working, it becomes clear, I believe, that Marx understood 
philosophy in two distinct ways.  The first is as a discipline which 
synthesises values out of empirical knowledge of certain basic facts of life.  
The second is as an abstract discipline which holds itself above the fray of 
human struggles for a better life.  In order to understand this difference, 
and the contemporary significance of the first conception, it is essential to 
keep in mind two elements of Marx’s political context.  First is the 
contradiction, remarked upon by all progressive German intellectuals of 
the time, between the economic and political ‘backwardness’ of Germany 
and its ‘advanced’ philosophical culture.  Second is the Young Hegelian 
understanding of the function of philosophy. 
It was a staple of German progressive politics in the early 1840s 
that philosophy would have to play an outsized role in the emancipation of 
Germany from its backward social and political conditions (Kouvelakis 
2003, 235).  Since German industrial development lagged behind England, 
it could not look to a powerful working class to lead progressive struggles.  
Furthermore, since Germany had not undergone a classic ‘bourgeois’ 
revolution as had France, its national political consciousness was also 
underdeveloped.  Hence intellectuals would have to play a more profound 
mediating role than in either England or France.  In other words, young 
German radicals argued that the very social backwardness of Germany 
enabled German intellectuals to develop a richer understanding of human 
emancipation because their thinking was not dominated by the need to 
first construct and manage a liberal-capitalist society.  German 
philosophers could prepare the future in theory, and had only to await the 
inevitable development of the social forces necessary to realize the idea.  
Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 5(2) Fall 2009: 17-35 
 
22 
‘The only practically possible liberation of Germany,’ Marx wrote, ‘is the 
liberation that proceeds from the standpoint of the theory [Feuerbach’s] 
which proclaims man to be the highest being for man’(Marx 1975a, 187). 
As is evident, at this point Marx does not conceive philosophy as 
‘only’ an interpretation of the world. He understands philosophy as the 
intellectual discipline that identifies and proclaims the universal value 
foundation for truly revolutionary political change.  That universal value 
foundation is a materialist understanding of human nature, an 
understanding which, as we will see, emphasises both humanity’s 
dependence on physical nature and interdependence with each other in 
social relationships (especially economic and political relationships).  The 
German revolution will be the most radical precisely because it rests on a 
deeper value foundation than was possible in France and England, because 
French and English revolutionaries had to fight both for and against liberal 
values. These values obscured from their understanding the deepest 
contradictions between capitalism and human freedom.  These 
contradictions themselves, Marx argued, stemmed from the alienation that 
capitalism imposes between the human collectivity and nature and 
between human individuals locked in zero-sum competitive social 
relationships.  
Since there was no revolutionary bourgeoisie in Germany, 
philosophers were able to grasp in mind what capitalist social dynamics 
denied in material reality.  The importance of this mediating role is what 
concerns me most.  For Marx philosophy is framed but not determined by 
the past and present.  Instead its systematic impulse towards universality 
pushes it beneath immediate contradictions in search of the ultimate 
foundations of human social life.  These ultimate foundations, the most 
basic facts of life, then function as the material out of which philosophy can 
synthesise universal values and posit these as the normative foundation of 
a free social order to be constructed in the future.    
It is this understanding of universal values as embedded in the 
fundamental facts of natural and social life that distinguishes Marx’s 
conception of philosophy from his Young Hegelian contemporaries.  
Beneath the class identities of the groups contending for power and 
legitimacy lies the humanity of the combatants. It is only when philosophy 
understands this humanity that it can become properly radical.  History, 
which Marx uses as a portmanteau term for all manner of empirical 
enquiries into the structure of human life, explicates the particular 
structure of the facts of life as they change across social space and time. 
Three general facts are crucial:  our dependence on nature, our social need 
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to produce what our lives require, and the general capability to do so as 
agents, or the fundamental form of human freedom this productive agency 
encodes.  ‘The task of history,’ he writes, ‘is to establish the truth of this 
world.  The task of philosophy, which is at the service of history, is to 
unmask estrangement in its unholy forms’ (Marx 1975a, 176). History 
establishes the truth of the given social world by comprehending the 
interaction between material forces and human struggles that have 
produced the different forms of human society.  This is an essentially 
empirical task.  In these early writings, however, Marx does not assume, as 
he later would, that the future can be known on the basis of understanding 
the laws of the present ‘with the precision of a natural science’ (Marx 1970, 
21).  Instead, the future is not an object of knowledge but a potential site 
for conscious self-creation.  The possibility of self-creation, however, 
presupposes definite normative goals.  Philosophy renders itself practical 
by synthesising these goals out of the raw material supplied by the 
empirical study of the ‘unholy forms’ of alienation.  In the absence of 
philosophy all one has are certain facts of life.  Since philosophy by its very 
nature concerns itself with the meaning of the facts of life, it is able to 
synthesise universal values out of what would remain, in the absence of a 
specifically philosophical intervention, mere facts.  The process here is 
analogous to the action of a chemist creating a new compound.  The raw 
materials for the compound are present in the elements that compose it, 
but the compound itself requires something not contained in the different 
molecular structures.  It requires the creative thought of the chemist who 
can see how they can be fit together in ways that do not appear in nature.  
Likewise, meaning, the basic condition of there being values, is not present 
in the raw facts of life as facts of life, but must be supplied by a 
philosophical intervention.  
Unmasking estrangement in its unholy forms cannot be an act of 
empirical criticism alone.  For in unmasking estrangement, one is doing 
more than saying what human beings are, one is saying what human beings 
ought to become through a collective political project.  If establishing the 
empirical truth of this world were sufficient to overcome it, then anytime 
one observes social problems one should also observe widespread 
movements to solve them.  By including a statement of philosophy’s task, 
however, Marx at least implies that universal values must be synthesised 
out of these facts as the necessary condition of motivating political change.  
If the truth of the world can be established by history, without that truth 
being in and of itself sufficient to motivate the process of political 
revolution, then philosophy, which deals with the ought-to-become, is an 
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irreducible practical contribution to the process of political change.  For 
any empirical discipline ruling values (the values of self-estrangement) can 
only be given, historically contingent facts.  The values that will organize 
the future, however, cannot be treated simply as facts, because the social 
reality in which they could circulate as facts does not yet exist. The values 
of the future exist as suppressed potentialities whose superior value 
cannot be proven by empirical arguments, since the data to support the 
empirical claims does not exist.  Thus, only normative arguments rooted in, 
but not reducible to, facts about human nature and how it is affected by 
given social formations can play the required role.  At the same time, 
philosophy does not preach from on high about mere aspirations or ideas.  
It is at the service of history.  The values of the future that it defends are 
possibilities that history has disclosed, but which the present structure of 
society cannot realize.  The values of the future are not mere oughts, (as 
Marx dismissed Kant’s Categorical Imperative) but oughts-to-become 
which motivate because they respond to real life-crises felt in the present.  
The realizability of these values can plausibly be established by reference 
to what can be known from history about human potentiality (Marx 1976, 
210-211). 
A philosophy at the service of history does not thereby invent 
values ex nihilo.  ‘We do not confront the world dogmatically with a new 
principle... we develop for the world new principles out of the principles of 
this world’ (Marx 1979a, 32).  In other words, the values of the world that 
ought-to-become are produced by human historical activity, but can reach 
the fullness of their development, expression, and enjoyment only in a 
different social world.  This social world cannot come to be without 
conscious effort, and conscious effort that would produce a new social 
world must be steered by universal, truly human values.  Connecting past 
and future is human activity; separating present from future are the 
institutions of the given society.  Marx is clear that these potentially ruling 
values cannot triumph simply as automatic results of the forces of history.  
‘It is not enough for thought to strive towards realization, reality itself 
must strive towards thought’ (Marx 1975a, 183).  This claim is far different 
from claiming, as Marx later would, that periods of crisis are the inevitable 
result of a contradiction between the forces and relations of production 
(Marx and Engels 1986, 39-40). That contradiction might generate social 
crisis, but revolution, to be successful, must also strive towards thought.  In 
other words, there must be a conscious normative goal to motivate people 
to respond to the crisis in a revolutionary rather than a reformist way.  
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Philosophy is thus a practical discipline for Marx to the extent that it 
clarifies the values according to which reality ought to strive. 
This essential point is supported by contrasting it with a different 
conception of philosophy to which Marx was, and remained, hostile. This 
conception of philosophy dominated the Young Hegelian movement from 
which Marx was struggling to differentiate himself (Breckman 1999).  The 
Young Hegelian understanding of philosophical practice was exemplified 
for Marx in the work of Bruno Bauer.  For Bauer, the relationship between 
history and philosophy is the converse of that posited by Marx.  Rather 
than philosophy being at the service of history, history is meaningful only 
in so far as it serves as the substance for philosophical interpretation.  
Moreover, the goal of this interpretation is not to derive from history the 
values that will lead radical political movements, but rather to disclose the 
unbridgeable chasm between philosophical ideals and historical 
development.  As Bauer wrote, ‘the critic participates neither in the 
sufferings nor the joys of society; he knows neither friendship nor love, 
neither hatred nor envy; he reigns in solitude, where now and then the 
laughter of the Olympian gods over the perversity of the world rings from 
his lips’ (Marx 1979b, 36).  For Bauer, therefore, philosophy is essentially 
contextless and timeless.  Its role is not to ‘strive towards reality’ but to 
demonstrate that no matter how far human striving goes, it can never 
attain the Olympian heights of speculative criticism. Its relationship to 
history is therefore entirely negative.  It can learn nothing from history, but 
nor, as a consequence, can it teach anyone anything of practical value.  As 
Bauer says, the critic reigns in solitude, above the swirl of events and the 
mundane joys and sufferings of ordinary people.  Bauer’s perspective is the 
purity of the Beautiful Soul of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit who dares 
not act for fear of burdening his principles with the unpredictability of 
consequences (Hegel 1987, 383-409). 
Marx, however, demands action, but not normatively blind action.  
Collective struggles must serve general yet definite values synthesised out 
of those aspects of the facts of life which are meaningful because they are 
requirements of human life and free human activity. What are the most 
salient facts?  To uncover these it is necessary to examine in general Marx’s 
understanding of how the relationships between human beings and nature 
and between human beings and each other become alienated under 
capitalist social relationships. Three facts are essential:  Human beings 
cannot live apart from on-going interactions with the natural world.  ‘The 
life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the 
fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature’ (Marx 1975b, 275).  
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As John Bellamy Foster demonstrates in exquisite textual detail, it is the 
primacy of this connection between humanity and the natural world that 
underlies Marx’s entire critique of capitalism. He argues that ‘alienation 
from the natural world is the fundamental form of human 
alienation’(Foster 2000, 174).  Second, human beings do not live ready to 
hand on what they find in nature but together in societies which 
cooperatively produce that which each and all require to live.  ‘Thus the 
social character is the general character of the whole movement:  just as 
society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him.  Activity 
and enjoyment, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are 
social’ (Marx 1979b, 298).  Finally, and as a consequence of the first two 
points, human freedom is at first a fact of the productive nature of human 
beings.  Freedom is not created in the first instance by political forms or 
legal structures, but is essentially the power of human beings to 
consciously produce their conditions of existence.  This production has 
both a biological and a social dimension.  Production both maintains 
human life and creates the meaningful forms through which human beings 
interpret their world and find their own purposes within it. As Marx says, 
‘the productive life is the life of the species.  It is life-engendering life.  The 
whole character of a species ... is contained in the character of its life-
activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character’ (Marx 
1979b, 276). These facts are transhistorical constants of human life.  Yet, 
read philosophically, from the standpoint of why they matter to human life, 
they permit the synthesis of definite universal values that can then guide 
the development of the world that ought-to-become.  
What explains the move from a mere description of general facts to 
the philosophical synthesis of the values they contain?  This crucial move is 
what Horkheimer, for example, does not explain. The movement is 
generated by the way in which specific structures of a given society can 
contradict the general facts of human life.  While some philosophers may 
object that contradictions can only hold between propositions, this view is 
overly narrow.  Specific social structures can contradict the general facts of 
life when those specific structures prevent people from satisfying their life-
requirements, even though the essential purpose of society is to enable 
people to satisfy those requirements.  Take for example the most general 
fact of human life, its dependence on the natural system of life-support. 
Human labour transforms the natural world in order to provide the goods 
necessary to sustain life.  In capitalism, by contrast, life becomes 
dependent upon labour and commodity markets; money becomes a 
condition of acquiring the goods that we need to live.  People can therefore 
NOONAN: Philosophy at the Service of History 
 
 
27 
suffer harm, not because resources in general are lacking, but because 
people lack paid work and therefore the money required to purchase 
needed resources.  In this way the specific structure of capitalist markets 
contradicts the general fact of the human need for certain resources to 
keep themselves alive.  People are intelligent and can recognize this 
contradiction.  When they do they construct normative arguments which 
maintain that it is wrong for social structures to impede access to that 
which they ought to provide: those life-requirements necessary to 
existence and a good life. 
Marx initially seems to have planned a much more systematic 
synthesis between empirical science and philosophy. He hoped to create a 
genuinely philosophical science that would supersede the opposition 
between natural and human science. ‘To assume one basis for life and one 
basis science is as a matter of course a lie’ (Marx, 1975b, 303).  Science 
presupposes life. The reproduction and meaningful social development of 
life presupposes on-going connection with the natural world in forms of 
productive relationship which prioritise the satisfaction of both natural 
and social life-requirements. The conscious nature of human productive 
relationships prove that human beings are not programmed machines but 
invent their own social conditions of life.  From these three claims it 
follows that science, the principled understanding of the universe by 
conscious human beings who dwell within it, must ultimately be unified.  
This unity cannot be reductive, however, because reductive physicalism 
eliminates the human sources of wonder, imagination, and caring that 
motivate science in the first place.  Instead, the unity, Marx suggests, must 
be synthetic and not reductive.  The science of which Marx speculates here 
would be a complex explanation of how the capacities and values that steer 
human action emerge out of productive activity and how they are 
furthered or impeded by the particular steering values of a given 
productive system.  All sound scientific inquiry must link back to the 
general conditions of life and what makes it better or worse.  The new 
science would thus be a science in which normative goals are intrinsic, not 
as mere facts as an empirical sociologist would treat them, but as real 
values whose progressive development and realization the empirical 
understanding of the facts of life can help advance.  In this synthesis, 
philosophy would be the crucial element since it is only the philosophical 
moment of the synthesis that can articulate the value dimension. Values 
are not mere artefacts found like minerals or plants, but but are 
consciously constructed.  The conscious construction is in turn dependent 
upon the philosophical understanding of life’s being meaningful.  Only in 
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such a new science would the “chimerical” relationship between 
philosophy and natural science which Marx laments be superseded (Marx 
1975b, 303).  
Marx never completed this prospective synthesis of empirical 
science and philosophy.  I will make some general suggestions in the next 
section about why such a synthesis ought to become a goal for scientists 
and philosophers alike today, and why philosophy alone can play the 
leading role in developing it.  At this point, however, let us sum up this part 
by returning to the Eleventh Thesis and see whether it still reads like the 
complete rejection of philosophy it is generally taken to be.  I believe that 
read in light of the preceding argument an initially unapparent ambiguity 
initially appears.  Is Marx repudiating philosophy as such in the Eleventh 
Thesis, or is he only repudiating the timeless and disengaged philosophy 
preached by Bauer and others?  The subsequent work of Marx does not 
resolve the ambiguity.  As his work turns to the critique of political 
economy he often draws analogies between his work and the methods of 
the natural sciences (Marx 1986, 21).  At the same time, the ‘prescientific’ 
normative ideas of alienation and truly human life-activity never disappear 
from his work, and are central to the Grundrisse and key arguments in 
Capital, especially his discussion of the labour process (Marx 1986, 173-
175).  I have no intention here of solving the ambiguity or insisting, as 
Althusser did, on a fundamental ‘epistemological break’ in Marx’s work, or 
in answering that charge, as others have already done (Althusser 1997, 49-
86; Meszaros 1970, 213-253).  Instead I want to put the ambiguity to work 
in vindicating for the present the idea of philosophical practice central to 
Marx’s own understanding of philosophy in 1843 and 1844. 
When Marx says that philosophers have only interpreted the world, 
he is clearly rejecting the sort of philosophy practiced by Bruno Bauer.  The 
rejection of philosophy as relentless negative critique of the present, 
undertaken from a purportedly timeless perspective claimed (but not 
defended) by the critic, does not entail, however, the rejection of a 
philosophy of the future whose relationship to the present is concretely 
situated criticism of the specific ways in which it impedes the free 
realization of human life-capabilities.  That sort of philosophy does not 
simply interpret the world, but nor does it trust the world’s transformation 
to inexorable historical forces or classes steered by their positional 
interests within a given social structure.  Instead, philosophy as engaged 
critique of the present argues against ruling system values on the basis of 
deeper values synthesised by the philosophical understanding of the self-
creative processes at the foundation of historical change.  By developing an 
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account of universal values as emergent from the facts of human life, this 
situated, timely, and critical philosophy provides something that no other 
discipline can: an understanding of values as neither mere natural facts 
(about genetically regulated behaviour, for example) nor historical facts 
(functional rules necessary for social reproduction) nor laws imposed by 
transcendent divinity (‘take it or leave it’ divine commands), but as goals 
that emerge in historical development whose full realization depends upon 
the conscious, collective construction of a future society in which 
contemporary life-crises have been resolved. 
Natural and social sciences would have a central role to play 
because they have immensely enriched our understanding of the natural 
and social frames within which human beings must act.  Knowledge of 
these frames, in addition to being intrinsic epistemic goods, also 
contributes to a positive knowledge of human freedom by disclosing the 
space in which conscious human action and the values that steer it can 
make a difference to the future development of society.  Knowledge of the 
frames of action does not, however, entail any conclusions about how we 
ought to act within them.  The frames are the facts that await uptake in the 
new philosophical synthesis Marx proposed but did not develop.  To 
actually develop that synthesis would require real collaboration and 
collective efforts, efforts which cannot be accomplished in a single paper.  
My focus in conclusion, therefore, will be on the role philosophy can play in 
such a synthesis, and why assuming that sort of role is key to the return of 
philosophy to the position of public prominence it ought to have. 
 
For a New Critical Public Philosophy 
The key to the solution of contemporary life-crises is the development of a 
new philosophical synthesis of foundational human values out of the facts 
of life in its natural and social dimensions.  On this basis the universal 
structure of contemporary social problems can be coherently understood 
as a unified crisis of life-value across the natural and social dimensions of 
being alive.  An essential moment of this synthesis is as rich an empirical 
understanding as it is possible to construct of the different concrete ways 
in which this unified crisis manifests itself.  Biochemistry, atmospheric 
science, ecology, zoology, and oceanography are all essential to 
understanding what it means to say that there is a crisis of the natural 
conditions of life-support.  Critical forms of empirical sociology, economics, 
history, and political science are essential to understanding the concrete 
effects of natural and social life-crisis on differently situated groups of 
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people.  The ‘lie’ implicit in establishing different bases for life and science 
in effect means that the ultimate warrant of science, natural or social, is not 
to control nature in the service of a particular structure of ruling values 
and its attendant asymmetries of wealth, power, knowledge, and status, 
but to generate the practical knowledge necessary to improve life-
conditions for each and all who live.  This goal, however, cannot be a goal 
generated by empirical science itself. Empirical science, in order to 
accumulate knowledge, must focus on its object and its object does not 
include ‘value’ in the normative sense required as the foundation of the 
solution to life crisis. Without philosophy the empirical disciplines risk 
‘sinking into empirical-technical minutiae,’ with no value-ground, as 
Horkheimer worried (Horkheimer 1993, 14). Marx takes us some of the 
way to the goal in so far as his early struggles with and against philosophy 
disclose the method by which values may be synthesised from the facts of 
natural and social life.  Yet Marx himself does not go far enough.  
In his early struggles with and against philosophy Marx assumes a 
normative understanding of values as universal steering goals leading the 
struggle for a free and life-supportive society, but he never defines value as 
such.  In his later political economic work value is defined in a one-sided 
way as exclusively materialised labour-time. That definition is inadequate 
to the deep normative arguments developed in his early work. These 
arguments were not essentially political economy, but focussed on the 
sorts of goals that political economy ought to serve.  Yet Marx does at least 
imply the required understanding of value in so far as he implies that life is 
the fundamental condition of there being any value at all.  This conclusion 
is implied in his claim that productive life is life-engendering life, and its 
converse, that there is a deep normative contradiction involved where, 
instead of engendering life, productive activity threatens or destroys it.  
Still, implying a conclusion and drawing a conclusion are logically distinct.  
Hence, in order to explicate the conception of value required by the new 
philosophical synthesis I am proposing, we need to go beyond Marx. 
   If we think of values in terms of the bases of motivation of an 
agent’s (individual or collective) action, and keep in mind the obvious, that 
action requires life, then the satisfaction of the natural and social 
requirements of being alive as an agent are universal conditions of any 
action at all.  From the perspective that understands life and the 
satisfaction of life’s requirements as universal preconditions of activity, a 
value is ‘that in the object which makes it an object of care and concern for 
a living subject.’   This definition applies across the range of things that can 
have value and the different ways in which things can be valued.  The 
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reason why people care about food is because it has nutritional value, the 
reason why people care about education is because it has cognitive value 
(it is the only way in which the intellectual capabilities of the human brain 
can be developed); the reason why people care about politics is because it 
has social value in so far as its outcomes determine the legal frames within 
which active life must be led.    
In general we can say that the overall goodness or badness of a 
society can be determined by reference to the degree to which its 
institutions and practices satisfy the natural and social life-requirements of 
its citizens being able to live as free, conscious agents whose concrete life-
expressions contribute, via a virtuous circle, to the ability of other citizens 
to live as free, conscious agents. To the extent that these requirements are 
satisfied, citizens’ lives increase in what McMurtry calls ‘life-value.’ Life-
value is realized both in the satisfaction of natural and social life-
requirements and the enjoyed expression of the human capabilities to 
sense and feel, think and act, in ways which do not unsustainably destroy 
the natural field of life-support or depend upon the exploitation and 
oppression of others for their expression and enjoyment (McMurtry 2008).  
Life-value is neither an abstraction nor a timeless ideal. It can always  be 
determined by reference to the life-requirements that given societies 
satisfy and do not satisfy, and by the range and depth of the meaningful 
human capabilities their satisfaction enables and their deprivation 
disables.   
A complete understanding of life-value requires a rich 
understanding of human life-requirements and human capabilities as well 
as the natural and social frames within which we must live.  Empirical 
natural and social science thus play an indispensible role in understanding 
what these frames are and what their impact on existing and future human 
life is and will be.  In order to create a society in which life-value is 
maximised for each and all, we need to understand the carrying capacity of 
the natural world, sustainable levels of resource extraction, how to create 
production processes which minimise toxic pollution, and how to produce 
clean energy at quantities sufficient for lives of maximum life-value but not 
beyond the carrying capacity of the natural life-support system.  This 
synthesis also requires the contributions of empirical social science, and 
especially, as Marx argued, history.  Those in positions of privilege need to 
hear, understand, and internalise the different experiences of exploitation 
and oppression of all the different subaltern groups.  Concrete political 
strategies for life-grounded change cannot be inferred deductively from 
the general principle of life-value maximization, but can only be advanced 
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democratically in movements whose goals are emergent expressions of all 
subaltern groups experiences and ideas for change 
  In this way, the philosophically articulated idea of life-value forms 
the basis of a new synthesis of philosophy and empirical science.  The 
unifying goal would be the full realization of life-value posited as the 
ought-to-become of the future. This ought-to-become is not a dogmatic and 
arbitrary stipulation of goal, but rather an empirically justified argument 
about the natural and social conditions for a life-coherent development of 
the human capabilities that make life worth living.  Fundamental social 
change in the direction of more life-valuable forms of social organization is 
inconceivable in the absence of society-wide repudiation of the rule of 
money-value accumulation in favour of life-value maximization for each 
and all. Such a change in values must be empirically defensible.  The 
required empirical defence can only be constructed with information 
concerning biological and social life-requirements and the capacity of 
natural and social worlds to satisfy them.   Together, philosophy and 
empirical science united in the synthesis here proposed are capable of 
motivating change by disclosing the ‘material irrationality’ of the ruling 
value-system.  By material irrationality, I mean that a set of ruling social 
values, if adhered to consistently over the long term, will undermine the 
life-support systems, natural or social, which even the ruling system values 
presuppose.  In the contemporary world, faced with the environmental, 
economic, and political crises noted in the introduction, philosophy can 
best put itself at the service of history by consistently and systematically 
exposing and confronting people with the material irrationality of the 
prevailing value system.  
As it was in Marx’s time, so too in ours, the ruling value system 
continues to judge value in terms of money value, and affirms or 
repudiates collective and individual projects according to the likelihood of 
their returning profit to those that invest their time in them.  As McMurtry 
argues, from within this system of value, ‘nothing which is not an atomic 
money sum or priced commodity ...  can register in this paradigm=s terms 
of reference, no shared life-good can exist for it’ (McMurtry 2002, 134).  Of 
course, this is not the only set of values at work.  It is the socially dominant 
system, however, in so far as it is disseminated through the media, 
dominates culturally approved symbols of success, guides economic 
enterprises, and shapes government policy across the globe.  Yet the 
growth of money value which this ruling value system demands is 
materially unsustainable. It is impossible, on a finite globe, for growing 
numbers of people to demand ever higher output and thus make ever 
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rising energy demands without finally causing a global collapse of the life-
support system of the natural world. What John Gray astutely remarks in 
relation to the looming oil crisis has general significance for any energy 
source;  ‘technology cannot repeal the laws of thermodynamics... When the 
energy costs of extracting oil exceed the energy thereby produced, no price 
can make the process profitable ... It is a consequence of the universal law 
of entropy’ (Gray 2003, 67).  Yet the ruling value system does in fact 
demand ever higher ‘standards of living’ as measured by market 
commodities consumed, and thus ever more energy to drive production. 
An empirically informed and life-grounded critical philosophical synthesis 
is the only intellectual basis which can expose the material irrationality of 
this system.  Disclosing this material irrationality is, in turn, the 
precondition for a new opening toward a future that pursues the 
realization of different values by different means.  This openness is not a 
contentless existential horizon, but a concrete opening for human action to 
change the world on the basis of new values generated from the empirical 
and rational demonstration of the material irrationality of the ruling value 
system.  If philosophy remains institutionally marginalized and publically 
silenced then the world will lose its systematic capacity for self-criticism 
and conscious value transformation at just the point in history when it 
most needs philosophy’s unique contribution. 
These are not esoteric arguments.  The need for a fundamentally 
different structure of ruling values is increasingly obvious because the 
evidence that speaks against the sustainability and justice of the present 
world order is more and more difficult to rationally deny.  It is evidenced 
by the growing recognition across societies of the ecological 
unsustainability of capitalist economic practices, of the inexcusable waste 
of the lives of the two billion people who are forced to subsist on two 
dollars a day, by the moral insanity of armed conflicts that do nothing but 
set the stage for revenge and more killing, of the vacuity of consumer 
culture and the anaesthetizing effects of mass entertainment, of the 
mindless subservience demanded of most workers, and of the empty shell 
of democracy that ignores the considered demands and life-requirements 
of majorities.  Far from being ‘only’ an interpretation, the philosophical 
practice of empirically informed social critique is the precondition of any 
intelligent and emancipatory social change that might emerge from these 
as yet disparate insights into the real structure of life-crisis today. 
 
 
Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 5(2) Fall 2009: 17-35 
 
34 
References 
Althusser, Louis. 1977. For Marx. London: Verso. 
Badiou, Alain. 1999. Manifesto for Philosophy. Albany:  State University of New York Press 
Badiou, Alain. 2001.  Ethics. London:  Verso. 
Badiou, Alain. 2005. Being and Event. London:  Continuum. 
Breckman, Warren. 1999. Marx, the Young Hegelians and the Emergence of Radical Social 
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Foster, John Bellamy. 2000. Marx’s Ecology. New York:  Monthly Review Press. 
Gray, John. 2003.  Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern. London:  Faber and Faber.  
Hegel, G.W.F.  1978. The Difference Between the Fichtean and Schellingian Conceptions of 
Philosophy. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing. 
Hegel, G.W.F. 1987.  The Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Horkheimer, Max 1993. ‘The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an 
Institute for Social Research.” In Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected 
Early Writings. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Kouvelakis, Stathis. 2003. Philosophy and Revolution. London: Verso. 
Lyotard, Jean Francois. 1984. The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Marx, Karl. 1970. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers. 
Marx, Karl. 1975a.  “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law.  
Introduction.” Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Volume Three. New 
York: International Publishers. 
Marx, Karl. 1975b. “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.” In Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Volume Three. New York:  International 
Publishers. 
Marx, Karl. 1976. The German Ideology. Moscow: Progress Publishers.. 
Marx, Karl. 1979a. “Letter to Arnold Ruge.” In The Letters of Karl Marx, ed. Saul K. Padover. 
Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.  
Marx, Karl. 1979b. “Letter to Ludwig Feuerbach.” In The Letters of Karl Marx, ed. Saul K. 
Padover. Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.  
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1986.  The Communist Manifesto.  Moscow: Progress 
Publishers. 
Marx, Karl. 1986.  Capital, Volume 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers.  
McMurtry, John. 2002. Value Wars.  London: Pluto Press. 
McMurtry, John. 2008. “What is Good, What is Bad: The Value of all Values Across Time, 
Places and Theories.” In Philosophy Theme: Encyclopaedia of Life-Support Systems. 
Oxford: UNESCO and EOLSS Publishers. Available at www.eolss.net . 
Meszaros, Istvan. 1970.  Marx’s Theory of Alienation. London: Merlin Press. 
Noonan, Jeff. 2006.  Democratic Society and Human Needs. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press. 
NOONAN: Philosophy at the Service of History 
 
 
35 
Noonan, Jeff. 2007.  “Social Conflict and the Life-Ground of Value.” Philosophy Today 51, no. 
4: 447-457.  
Noonan, Jeff. 2008a.  “Human Rights and Global Life-Support Systems.”  Philosophy and 
World Problems:  Encyclopaedia of Life-Support Systems. Oxford:  EOLSS 
Publishers and UNESCO. Available at www.eolss.net . 
Noonan, Jeff. 2008b. “Normative Political Economy.” In Research Focus on Political 
Economy, ed. Walter Levin.  Schenectady: Nova Science Publishers.  
Suchting, Wal. 1979.  “Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: A New Translation and Notes Towards 
a Commentary.” In  Issues in Marxist Philosophy. Volume Two: Materialism, eds. 
John Mepham and D.H. Ruben. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press. 
 
